To overrule Rubin twice, holding three cards in his first suit, risks the possibility of more than verbal violence

"The Olympiad final", TBW 12.1980, p. 11

 -------------------------------------------------------------------

 [Declarer is in 7Hx and is void in spades opposite Sx K Q J 10 4 at the dummy. Kaplan writes:]

"Seven hearts is a highly practical contract, likely to make whenever West holds the spade ace (he will probably lead it) and whenever East holds it (he will play it on dummy's king); and there are still chances in diamonds, even if no one has the ace of spades."

"Coming through for Rye" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 1/1981, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

At Table Two, the Graves-Mittelman auction to six clubs was natural, if inexplicable; certainly Mittelman didn't know what Graves was doing, so why should I?

Ibid, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Murray, North at Table One, deemed his hand too strong for a 16-18 one notrump. Thus [after 1Cx-p-1Dx-(1Sx)] he faced a fierce rebid problem at his second turn, which he solved, in the modern fashion, with a cue-bid.

Ibid, p. 15

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Opponents bid and raise diamonds, Rodwell has Axxx]

At Table One, Rodwell, West, competed up to the three level, "knowing" that with East marked short diamonds [he actually had xx] almost all of West’s honors would fit well with partner’s hand. Alas, partner had no hand for them to fit with.

"Coming through for Rye, II" (report on the 1981 trials), TBW 2/1981, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Rodwell holds J10753/10842/--/AQ72. At game all, partner passes, RHO opens 1D and he doubles]

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Even with clubs two-two, the contract [3NT] was headed for down one at least (maybe down four) if South found a spade lead from

Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J 9 / 4/ J 10.

However, in a spectacular demonstration of today’s "never lead the suit you’ve bid" fashion, Woolsey crossed up declarer by leading the ace of hearts. Plus 400, 11 imps to France.

"Rosenblum Cup, II", TBW 1/1983, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[The USA six-man team played against a French four-man team for the 1982 Rosenblum final]

The USA handicaps were that they had had a more relaxing semi-final match, and that in each session one U.S. pair had to sit out, chewing fingernails, developing headaches or sore throats, perhaps risking ulcers by watching Rama. On a four-man team, questions as to a player’s minor aches and pains, his cold symptoms burgeoning in the steady Biarritz downpour -such questions never arise. At game time, the player sits automatically in his appointed place, so he had better feel well. In my view, therefore, a four-man team has the edge.

"Rosenblum Cup, III", TBW 2/1983, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

If I were South, I would probably have led ace of clubs, to look at dummy. I wouldn’t have liked what I saw.

"Trials for Stockholm", TBW 3/1983, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[An unsound 6NT makes on a squeeze]

... with East holding six hearts along with all the length in spades, the twelfth trick dropped from heaven into declarer’s lap, the reward for clean living, no doubt. (A sinful South would have received a heart lead and continuation, which would probably mess up his entries.)

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At both tables South holds: KJ1097/A4/AK6/J82, opens 1NT, North goes to 3NT]

When I started to play bridge, everyone would bid: one spade-two spades; two notrump-four spades. Plus 420, for a tied board. Nowadays, for some reason that is far too subtle for me, it is fashionable to open with one notrump. I admit that it makes no difference, since the result, a tied board, is the same. Everyone went honorably down in three notrump, no swing.

"Trials for Stockholm, II", TBW 4/1983, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At love all, after RHO deals and passes, South holds

--- / AKQ9874/10752/92]

The problem with opening four hearts on a hand like South’s is that this inevitably acts as a sort of left-handed Texas, transferring the opponents into four spades. Then, partner is supposed to judge whether to let them play -but how can he, knowing little about South’s pattern?

"Waikiki Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1983, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Kay made 1NT while his team-mates made 4H]

Kay’s one-notrump contract (...) could not be defeated. Indeed, he ended up with an overtrick (he habitually overplays).

Ibid, p. 15

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Norman Kay makes the killing lead]

Never fear! Norman led the five of hearts (after coming home from a singularly unsuccessful National, some ten years ago, I anonymously sent Norman a copy of Bob Ewen’s book on opening leads -maybe he read it.)

Ibid, p. 17

-------------------------------------------------------------------

About undisciplined preempts:

The young activists remember only the occasions on which the enemy fall on their faces, owing to the clever preempt; if the enemy get to a better spot than the other table, or make a contract down there, that is owing to the usual ineptitude of teammates. (...) In my opinion, the strictly preemptive effect of three-bids breaks about even over the long run, with lucky and unlucky results about in balance (perhaps the spade preempts show a small profit, the others a small loss). Three-bids can show a decent profit, though, from their descriptive effect: if partner knows within narrow limits what the preemptor holds, he can take informed action while everyone else is groping in the dark.

"The Waikiki Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1983, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

After 16 boards, the totals were 68 to 2 -at least KANTAR were on the scoreboard. No, they weren’t! One of the tables had taken too much time, seriously inconveniencing the tournament directors, whose afternoon team might be delayed. Hungry and furious, the directors reacted by penalizing both teams. (...) Despite the appeal by both teams, asking that all penalties be waived, the powers that be remained firm. The remarkable score stood: ROOT 64, KANTAR minus 4.

Ibid, p. 11-12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At game all, West has doubled 2C and South redoubles; at the other table, East runs and finally goes for 200]

"East and West", 9/1983, p. 20

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bergen deals at favorable and opens 2D, a two-under for spades, on

A984/4/10643/9874]

 "Spingold in Jazz City", TBW 10/1983, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[The famous case of Bergen’s dubious claim]

"You make two trumps", said declarer, Bergen, to Ross, West, showing his cards. "I’m not going to do anything stupid," said Bergen, in the process of doing something stupid, since he had claimed without considering the position if West should win and lead a diamond.

Ibid, p. 17

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Bergen’s creativity was manifested on the second deal of the match, where he picked up as dealer, nonvulnerable versus vulnerable,

9 8 5 / A 10 9 8 / K 10 7 2 / 6 4

Seduced by those spot cards, he opened two hearts, an ostensibly natural weak two-bid. [Partner goes to 4H] The silent opponents were cold for two diamonds. Four hearts went down only 50.

"Spingold in Jazz City, II", TBW 11/1983, p. 4

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Another Bergen preempt went sour when he opened two spades, nonvulnerable, on

7 5 3 /Q / J 9 8 5 / J 10 6 5 3

This was, you will be relieved to learn, a preempt in clubs. When the doubling stopped, partner was declarer at three diamonds, down 300 -only a 5 imp loss, since Bergen’s teammates scored an excellent plus 110.

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bergen opens 2D, weak two in spades, on

87642/J93/AK3/104 -opponents can make 6S!]

You may be surprised to see Bergen, East at Table One, holding such a strong hand for his weak two, but remember that he was vulnerable against not, which dictates caution. Hamman-Wolff have not geared their bidding towards reaching six-spade contracts after enemy weak-two spade bids (even Bergen’s).

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

A Pakistani, on favorable vulnerability, heard a strong, artificial one club to his right; he held

84 / 972 / 10 5 3 2/ J 10 8 4

Three clubs, he bid, friskily. Alas, partner had no sense of humor. When the smoke cleared, PAKISTAN was in five clubs doubled, down six, 1100. The vulnerability was not favorable enough for that.

"Round 14", TBW 12/1983, p. 18

-------------------------------------------------------------------

West’s double was, presumably, a matter of honor (not through the Iron Duke!) not score, since down one doubled, for a swing of 850, yields the same 13 imps as one down undoubled.

"Stockholm semi-finals", TBW 2/1984, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

You are the dealer with favorable vulnerability, holding,

K 5 2 /A /Q 10 4 3/ Q 9 8 6 2

and open one diamond. (You wouldn’t? I’m glad to hear it, but Meckstroth did open.)

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Franco carefully picked his way among winning lines and found the only losing line in a game everyone else made.

"Stockholm semi-finals, II", TBW 3/1984, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Lauria leaped to three spades, rather gaily. LHO doubled (negative, thank the Lord), and Mosca had a little fun too, raising to four spades. Szwarc-Mouiel had no sense of humor. They doubled, led trumps early and collected (...) 1100.

Ibid

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A 3D weak jump overcall is raised to 5D]

Ibid, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

They had been playing and playing for a week and a half, using some 25 systems to make nearly 50,000 sensible bidding decisions plus a few hundred flaky calls and a few dozen brilliant ones (a brilliant call is a flaky one that works like a charm.)

"Same old story" (1983 BB final), TBW 4/1984, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The results throughout this match seem to point to a strange conclusion: can it be that it pays to bid with strong hands, and to pass with weak ones?

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On overcalling 4H with a hand like

9 6/ A Q J 9 8 7 3 2/ A J 6/ ---]

It is less obvious to me than it was to Hamman and Lauria (...) that one should jump to four hearts with the West card. (...) The major argument against preempting is that your side has no idea what to do if the opponents bid on -you know nothing about partner’s hand, and he knows next to nothing about yours. The usual tactic is for the preemptor to double next to show extra values, as Lauria did (...) However, this double does not solve the problem -it merely allows the preemptor to blame partner for any bad result while claiming credit himself for any good one.

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Previously, Kaplan had criticised a 1NT opening with a 5-card major that led in a loss]

With these cards,

K 10 4 / A K Q 6 5 / 7 4 / A 4 2

Franco opened a sensible one heart; at the other table, Sontag preferred to preempt with one notrump -his sixth sense had told him, perhaps, that the opponents were cold for four spades. Against the one-heart opening, the Americans easily reached their game, scoring 620; against one notrump, the Italians stopped at two spades, plus 170 -10 imps to the USA. Now I know why to open one notrump with such hands.

Ibid, p. 17

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Both Easts reply 2C to partner’s 1D on

A K / 9 5 / 10 6 4 3 / A K Q J 5, end to 3NT]

Both auctions above bristled with modern science, yet got nowhere. In the bad old days, everybody used to jump shift with hands like East’s (vulgar and disgusting, I know), and the only problem remaining was to stay out of seven. Is this progress?

Ibid, p. 17-18

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Garozzo, behind the heart bidder with,

10 9 7 / K J 9 8 2 / Q 7 6 / A 7

had been lulled to sleep by a long relay auction when it came time to double.

"Same old story, II" (1983 BB final), TBW 5/1984, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Then DeFalco-Franco had one of those unusual unusual-notrump disasters, the sort they tell me never happen.

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At love all, West bids 3NT at third position and North holds:

K J 10 9 7/ A 8 5 2/ 5/ K 9 6; partner is weak with spade void and five hearts]

In the dumb old days we used to have to pass over one notrump with hands like North’s, accepting the fact that the odds were wrong when opener had an ace more than we did. With our dumb luck (we were lucky in the old days), we ended up plus 300 or so against four spades doubled. Nowadays, there are all sorts of delicious devices for entering the auction.

At Table Two, the Americans used Landy to get to four hearts doubled ... minus 500.

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

"Vanderbilt in San Antone", TBW 7/1984, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

"Hooks and Crooks - the '84 Spingold", 11/1984, p.7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

... so the loss from two-bids was held under 30 imps, an affordable price for a little fun.

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid, p. 10-11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

If you are wondering about South's strange pass to five clubs, remember that his partner's third-seat openings are not bonded by the Lloyd's of London, and that their one-diamond openings do not promise diamonds.

Kaplan Nuggets III: 1985-1989

"The Austrians foolishly doubled a lay-down slam, for no apparent reason except, perhaps, the a priori unlikelihood of one side’s taking 12 tricks."

"Knockout in Seattle" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 2/1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Isn’t it strange how little leeway modern responders give openers, considering what they themselves open?

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

On Board 1 of all matches, the North player picked up, as dealer, neither side vulnerable,

9 5 / K Q 8 7 5 3 2 / Q 7 4 / K

K872/10/AJ103/J873

and the result was most often 500 (...) The opponents, with only 21 HCP and no great fit, might not get above the one level left to their own devices, just as well since this is about what they could make.

"Knockout in Seattle, II" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 3/1985, p. 3

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Overcall, fit-showing jump by partner, minimum-showing rebid by advancer, all pass]

What an intelligent way to miss an easy vulnerable game!

Ibid, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Vul. against Nonvul, South opens 1S, West preempts 5C and North holds: AQJ3/A6/KJ976/95. In the Open final, both jumped to 6S, while the Ladies raised to 5S]

"Knockout in Seattle, III" (Report on 1984 Olympiad), TBW 4/1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A voluntarily-bid grand slam goes down four]

Yes, if you are going down in a grand slam it’s better to go down more than one -but there are limits!

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

"Le Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1985, p. 18

-------------------------------------------------------------------

BRAMLEY recovered 7 imps after both teams opened this disgusting 14-count:

K J 7 / Q J / K Q 7 6 5 / Q 10 5

Katz had the grace to be ashamed of the hand, never taking another bid; partner competed to two spades, plus 110. Rodwell, in contrast, was proud of his picture gallery. He freely raised spades, and then accepted a game invitation; down 200 in four spades.

Ibid, p. 20

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[After a relay auction that is not reported]

On the seventh round of bidding, Becker had to choose a contract knowing partner’s exact shape and his high-card content. Three notrump? Yes, but partner’s final reply to a relay had been four spades. So, Becker chose five diamonds. Unluckily, that went minus 50.

Ibid, p. 21

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Becker opens 1H, Rubin responds with a game-forcing relay, 2C]

Ibid, p. 22

-------------------------------------------------------------------

They had played rather briskly, to no purpose since their opponents all proceeded in the pace of a particularly lazy glacier.

"Le Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1985, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The vulberability was favorable, but not the result.

Ibid

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Crane, West, was taught at his mother’s knee that the Lord gives you an ace-king combination to tell you what to lead. (...) But Weichsel, West at Table 1, had learned his bridge 20 years later, after it has been established as gospel that you should lead trumps when your side has all the high cards.

[As it turned out, Crane won an extra doubled undertrick]

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[North makes a two-suited overcall, South has to play it -for down 1100 as it turns out]

There ought to be a law allowing you to make partner play his own horrors.

"Tribulations" (1985 ITT), TBW 8.1985, p. 15

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bergen makes a two-under preempt, 2S for clubs, Cohen passes 2S]

Cohen has seen Bergen’s suits before, and, anyway, this way partner would be declarer for his own disaster.

Ibid, p. 16

-------------------------------------------------------------------

On Ross’s birthday, six diamonds might have been a make, but not this day.

 "Tribulations, II" (1985 ITT), TBW 9.1985, p. 21

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In a way, it is a bonanza for a team to suffer disasters at both tables on the same board. Still, no one can afford many bonanzas like this one.

Ibid, p. 23

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Kokish overcalls RHO’s 1D with 1H, love all, on:

J6/AKQJ986543/9/-]

... Kokish’s rather sound overcall (I have seen him bid with less)

"Las Vegas Spingold", TBW 10.1985, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At both tables, 3rd-seat player opens on a 4-point, 5-card weak two with disastrous results]

Maybe the players should have accepted the bridge judgment of the ACBL Board of directors, who have proclaimed that one must have 5 high card points for a weak two.

"Las Vegas Spingold, II", TBW 11.1985, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The five diamonds at Table 1 could have been beaten 300 by a heart lead (...) However, North led ace of diamonds to look at the dummy and what he saw was that he could collect only 100.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Holding a monster, Ira Rubin opens 1C and over partner’s 1H fakes a reverse with 2D on Axx. Partner, Burger, holding five diamonds and three points, passes!]

The official transcript shows no unusual sensory data from Table 1 at the point that Burger passed two diamonds.

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

"Olympiad in Venice, IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[They languish at 3C when 6C is on]

On the auction in the Open Room of the Women’s, playing three clubs as nonforcing (...) has much to be said for it. Of course, whatever is said should be said to partner before the session.

Ibid, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Declarer plays 7S]

He won the king-of-clubs lead, cashed ace of diamonds (apparently as a sporting gesture, in case an opponent was void.)

 "Olympiad in Venice, IV", TBW 3/1989, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[After a nonvul. save went for 1100]

"Favorable" vulnerability isn’t all that favorable under the new scoring.

"The 1989 Vanderbilt, II", TBW 8/1989, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Understandably, he was reluctant to bid to the four level, vulnerable, opposite a third-seat opening (partnerships who frequently open light in third position are seldom aware of what it costs them).

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Soloway (...) also stole the contract undoubled, with his gay leap to three notrump. However, merciless defense made the theft expensive.

"A berth for Perth", TBW 9.1989, p. 29

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Pollack-Cohen were the only pair to reach a sensible [slam] contract, with their 12 top tricks, 33 high-card points, four aces and a running suit. Of course, the running suit was not easy to discover since no East was foolish enough to bid his diamonds [over partner’s 2C bid] -everyone knew better than to suggest a jack-fifth suit on a slam auction. Yes, there are those who prefer jack-fifth opposite ace-queen-ten to ace-king-fifth opposite ten doubleton, but they are peasants.

"A berth for Perth, II", TBW 10.1989, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Next, Woolsey made believe that this hand,

10 5 / A J 9 / A K / K 8 6 5 4 2

was an one-notrump opening, ending in three notrump, down 300; Soloway considered that he had an unbalanced hand with long clubs, so he ended in two clubs, plus 100.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In second seat, nobody vulnerable, Goldman opened,

Q 7 6 3 / 10 / Q J 6 / J 8 7 4 2

with one spade (Goldman-Soloway open light systemically when non-vulnerable, so it is not clear whether this was a super-shaded light opening or a rather heavy psych.)

Ibid, p. 13

[Hamman reads the cards perfectly, makes 2NT with an overtrick]

Making three, plus 150 (what a waste of talent to have him declarer in a part-score!).

"Chicago Spingold, II", TBW 1/1990, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On a 1D opening on: Q63/Q3/QJ10952/K9]

My first bridge partner used to bid on such hands -still does, actually; he would decide later whether to treat his action as a psych or as a light opening.

"Antipodean Bowl, II", TBW 5/1990, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

There was a swing in both matches when layers impiously chose not to lead their God-given sequence.

"Texas Vanderbilt", TBW 9/1990, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On grand slams:]

It is astonishing how often a player in seven is laying huge odds because the opposing team did not reach even six at the other table.

"Texas Vanderbilt, II", TBW 10/1990, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On keycard disasters]

Many with-it partnerships are up to six aces, plus several queens of trumps -talk about inflation!

"1990 Spingold", TBW 11/1990, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East opens lightly, opponents get to 4S and West doubles]

It is not clear where West got his double of four spades in the Closed Room; perhaps from the same place that East got his opening bid.

"'90 Spingold", TBW 1/1991, p. 12-13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This slam had a trifling feature to recommend it: it made (clubs four-three, diamonds three-three, nothing bad elsewhere).

"Swiss teams" (report on 1990 Rosenblum Cup), TBW 2/1991, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The Canadians made dubious penalty doubles at both tables (dubious by my standards, but I double fewer voluntarily bid games than most -I figure that good opponents, looking at their cards, may know what they are doing).

"Swiss teams" (report on 1990 Rosenblum Cup), TBW 2/1991, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

West chose to lead king of clubs, club. (Faithful readers of my reports will know that ‘chose to lead’ carries the implication that I would have chosed differently -to me, a trump lead stands out.)

"Swiss teams, II" (report on 1990 Rosenblum Cup), TBW 3/1991, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am reluctant to add this German auction to my vast list of KCB disasters (each one, Jeff assures me, was the fault of the players, not the method), since I do not really know what went wrong.

"Swiss teams, III" (report on 1990 Rosenblum Cup), TBW 4/1991, p. 8
-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A bold game makes after not best defence]

I must say that it would never occur to me to jump to four hearts over three diamonds with those South cards. I suppose that explains why I am writing about world’s championships not winning them.

Ibid, p. 9
-------------------------------------------------------------------

At table 4, Zia was declarer at five clubs (actually, Deutsch was supposed to hold the South cards, but Zia had reversed the board -what a hand hog!)

"Boardwalk Vanderbilt", TBW 6/1991, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[They open 1NT on Q 10 7 / 6 5 / K Q J 10 7 3 / A J]

It strikes me as simple justice that the two players who pretended that the West hand was a strong notrump should be the two to miss slam.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Four spades is a hazardous contract even if trumps split evenly (it looks as though the Norths at Tables 1 and 3 accepted their own invitations when they went on to game; did they have more confidence in partner’s dummy play than in his bidding judgment?)

Ibid, p. 14

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In four diamonds, they only had to guess the trump suit. Rosenberg was deprived of his chance to show the Vugraph audience what a good guesser he is when Manfield, North, chose the queen of diamonds [=trumps] as the opening lead: plus 130.

"Boardwalk Vanderbilt, II", TBW 7/1991, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

At Table 3, East had bid spades, so she tried a surprise, the nine of diamonds. Declarer may have been surprised, but he was not dismayed.

"Five days in May" (ITT trials for 1991 BB) TBW 8/1991, p. 6.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am ancient enough to remember times when, holding,

AK632/A2/K74/KQJ

you could expect an unencumbered auction, even though you were in fourth seat, vulnerable against not.

Ibid, p. 9

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[West dealer, EW vul. North opens 1H, East has KQ64/10/AQ6543/J3]

Hamman, East at Table 1, chose to overcall in his long suit (probably I’d do that too; still, I’d worry that God had dealt me those tiny spots in diamonds as a warning). In the old days, he’d have escaped the axe, but he was done in by a modern negative double when North had a penalty pass. (...)

Sontag, East at Table 2, piously heeded God’s warning, overcalling at the one level in spades. In the old days he’d have been nailed by an immediate penalty double, but the modern negative-double style let him escape.

Ibid, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[East was first to speak, love all, with

J109863/72/--/KQJ104; this was opened 1S, 2S and 3S at the other tables.]

Meanwhile, Gerard, East at Table 3, had taken the old-fashioned view that if his hand didn’t look like a one-bid, two-bid or three-bid, maybe he ought to pass it.

"Five days in May, III" (ITT trials for 1991 BB) TBW 10/1991, p. 5.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[North has A9652 in diamonds opposite South’s KQJ10753]

Ibid, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

This led to a huge swing after Sutherlin’s courageous four-spade bid (...) (I would have used a different adjective had he taken a painful penalty).

Ibid

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[A sacrifice at favourable vulnerability goes for 1100]

Nonvul versus vul isn’t all that favourable nowadays.

Ibid, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[At third position, non vul. against vul., Zia opens 1NT strong with 43/1084/3/KQJ10872]

Zia, West at Table 2, counted 6 points extra for length plus 3 for shortness to reach the value for his notrump opening. The three-notrump contract he reached temporarily was indeed the winning spot, although for North-South.

"Las Vegas Spingold, II", TBW 1/1992, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

ZIA went farther ahead when Meckstroth-Rodwell (I know you’re not going to believe this) stopped at two spades with 26 high-card points plus two five-card suits, without a misfit -and they were right.

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[South is void in clubs]

No doubt, South tried to lead the club pip from his hand diagram when he won the ace of hearts, but the humorless directorial staff would not allow that.

"The 1991 Bermuda Bowl", TBW 2/1992, p. 11

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On unsound penalty doubles:]

The Laws should really allow a player who has made a penalty double to look at his cards again, then undouble.

"K.C. Vanderbilt", 7/1993, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I cannot tell you what it was about those West cards that induced two players to start doubling (...) Perhaps it was the vulnerability -there is a widely held theory that your side can take more tricks than theirs when you are vulnerable and they are not.

"Tribulations", TBW 9/1993, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid, p. 6

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[On a difficult hand valuation argument]

I could happily argue either side of that argument (of any argument, some say, unkindly.

Ibid, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[West has to lead against 6NT holding:

J 2/ J864/ Q 10 8 /Q 6 5 3]

It is my idea of hell to be on lead against six notrump with the West hand.

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The auction at Table 1 shows "when in doubt, bid one more" gone berserk. (...) North’s six hearts bid looks bizarre to me. East’s six spades might be justified if he had a strong feeling that his screenmate was never going to stop bidding. Right! Seven hearts doubled went down 800, 12 imps to Spingold against the 200 scored from five hearts doubled at Table 2.

"Tribulations, II", TBW 10/1993, p. 5

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Majors score more only when you make something; after opening on that trash, you go down.

Ibid, p. 13

-------------------------------------------------------------------

As Levin, West, suspected, there was no duplication of values, but there weren’t many values.

"Tribulations, III", TBW 11/1993, p. 10

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The North-South auction in the Open Room was confused. It ended, like most confused slam auctions, in six notrump.

"Tribulations, IV", TBW 12/1993, p. 33

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[North has AKQxxxx opposite partner’s singleton; 6C is on]

Three Norths did have a sort of transfer available, but no one succeeded in persuading partner to utter the word "clubs."

"Washington Spingold", TBW 1/1994, p. 8

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

At Table 1, Aa, East for Norway, followed the general rule for freak hands: bid one more -nothing really ghastly happens to the declarer.

"Bowls of Chile", TBW 3/1994, p. 7

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[First to speak at favorable, Leufkens holds:

984/J4/QJ987/763 with 2C, showing 0-5, any pattern or very strong]

How could anyone else bear to pass the South cards, first seat at favorable vulnerability? In my youth, almost everyone -even Norman!- opened that hand.

Ibid, p. 12

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Bergen (and Zenkel in another match) open a 10-12 1NT on:

A107/1093/K4/J7632]

"Bowls of Chile, II", TBW 4/1994, p. 3

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The "Law" misled one of its most ardent fans here. Cohen (...) could expect that each side has a nine-card fit, in which case, according to the Law, there would be 18 total tricks, not enough for the five lecel. Even if partner had a five-card heart suit, 19 total tricks, a five-level save could not be very profitable. Illegally, though, there were actually 20 total tricks available, ten to each side: the Dutch 620 gave them 11 imps.

Ibid, p. 11

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It is astonishing how much controversy is caused by players who, trying to be helpful, tell their opponents not what the partnership has agreed but what they think a call should mean.

Ibid

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[The auction: 1S-4NT/5S-7D, with one ace missing]

Sanborn intended her five spades to show two key cards plus the queen of trumps. McCallum understood two aces plus the spade king. Oh, for the simple days when the deck had only four aces!

"Bowls of Chile, IV", TBW 5/1994, p. 19

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[Mc Callum opens weak 2D, Sanborn jumps to 5D while six is on; then Zenkel overcalls 5H and buys the contract undoubled]

In my youth, women bid more gently. In the Open Room, McCallum’s weak two-bid contained two aces more than it might have, nonvulnerable, which explains her partner’s conservatism.

(...)

"Bowls of Chile, IV", TBW 6/1994, p. 14

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... some small swings on what appears to the naked eye to be an one-notrump deal, although modern methods did not all agree with that observation.

Ibid, p. 12

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Wolff, dealer, allowed the favorable vulnerability to persuade him to open an uncharacteristic three hearts on,

6 5 4 3 / Q 10 9 7 5 2 / 10 / 5 3

This would be routine for one of the young modernists, who no doubt do well with their style, but Wolff is no kid -so, of course, he got nailed. Double by LHO, all pass -down 500, with his teammates plus 90 at the other table.

"San Diego Spingold", TBW 10/1994, p. 5

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Because of West’s opening bid, the spade finesse was unattractive (...) (even Rodwell might occasionally have been dealt 13 points.)

"San Diego Spingold, II", TBW 11/1994, p. 8-9

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On lead against six diamonds, Soloway, West, no doubt reached for the king of hearts, but it was the king of spades that hit the table. [The cards lie extremely lucky for declarer, Wolff; Kaplan notes:] When you are president of the WBF, the cards behave for you.

"San Diego Spingold, III", TBW 12/1994, p. 5

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[Opener bids 4S, passed out to East]

In the Closed Room, Rodwell, East, doubled four spades, which would have been fine if it have been for penalties, but to pass partner’s first double is considered vulgar nowadays; so, Meckstroth took out to five hearts. Lair, South, doubled that, which probably would have been fine if North had passed (...) But, of course, Passell, North, took out. East’s second double was respected: down 300.

"San Diego Spingold, IV", TBW 2/1995, p. 8-9

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In my experience, five times as many imps are lost in competitive auctions by passing as by bidding.

"Knockout in New Mexico", TBW 3/1995, p. 7

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I cannot explain why Gawrys (...) decided to double five hearts (maybe he is a devotee of the popular superstition that when a nonvulnerable side goes to the five level it is always sacrificing).

"Knockout in New Mexico, II", TBW 4/1995, p. 9

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[Defending against a 7H off A-K of trumps]

West led a club against seven hearts doubled, giving East a ruff. Now Balicki, East, decided to cash his ace of trumps before the mice could get at it [and crashed partner’s bare king]: down only 300.

"Knockout in New Mexico, III", TBW 5/1995, p. 24

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[West leads against a doubled and vulnerable contract blowing a trick]

Against Kokish at Table 2, in two spades doubled, West led 300 points, the spade nine: down 500, 14 imps to Canada.

"Bowls of China, II", TBW 2/1996, p. 4

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West’s double of five diamonds at Table 1 seems to me to have little relation to his hand. A priori, the opponents are unlikely to be able to take 11 tricks on any deal, but the fact of their bidding five must change the odds.

"Vanderbilt in Philly", TBW 8/1996, p. 4

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The defense against four diamonds was clever (...) making six, plus 170. Why clever? Because when the opponents have missed a touch-and-go game, it is a good idea to let them make overtricks.

Ibid, p. 9

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[RHO opens 1H, you double on A72/3/AK76432/AJ and RHO jumps to 4H passed to you]

This is the sort of decision that gives bridge players ulcers: if you bid five diamonds, you could be down three when you could beat them in top cards, yet either five diamonds or four hearts -or both- could be a make. My scarred stomach tells me that, over a lifetime, it is better to bid, and so it proved here.

"Vanderbilt in Philly, II", TBW 9/1996, p. 21

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I do not guarantee I'll never open one notrump holding a five-card major, but so far in a long bridge career I have never found the occasion to do so.

"Vanderbilt in Philly, III", TBW 10/1996, p. 9

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According to the "Law", there should be a total of 23 tricks for the two sides; had there been, NICKELL would have gained 17 imps. In reality, there were only 20 tricks taken altogether, so ZIA won 12 imps.

Ibid, p. 14

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[North opens 1D on J963/Q96/K10532/A, South goes on to 3NT on

AQ10/8542/J/KQ643; 3NT made at both tables after friendly defence and lie of cards.]

There is this striking aspect of the modern style, as practiced by Meckstroth-Rodwell and Stewart-Weinstein the North hand is a routine opening bid (after all, it is a nine over average in high cards), yet a hand like South’s is deemed strong enough for game (as it would be, just barely, opposite an old-fashioned opening).

"The road to Rhodes, II", TBW 12/1996, p. 5

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At Table 2, Meckstroth was declarer at three notrump with unaccustomed strength [25 HCP] -he is more comfortable with 21 HCP.

Ibid, p. 7

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[Kaplan is about to analyze a complex play involving a hold-up]

Before continuing, make sure that none of your lovable aunts and uncles -you know the ones I mean; they always lead fourth best, cover an honor with an honor, and so on- aren’t reading over your shoulder. They might get the right idea about bridge.

"The road to Rhodes, IV", TBW 2/1997, p. 7